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Abstract
Multi-unit common value uniform price auctions with demand function bids
are in widespread use. I analyze this auction when there is an informed bidder
and other uninformed bidders. In such auctions it is easy to construct equi-
libria in which uninformed bidders earn a positive payoff by free riding on the
informed bidder’s information. Here I ask whether such free riding arises only
in special cases, and should therefore be considered a pathological exception,
or whether it is the norm in equilibrium. To answer this, I derive the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for uninformed bidders to earn a zero payoff in
all equilibria. The condition requires that there should be enough demand by
uninformed bidders at least at low prices so that no single uninformed bidder
is “pivotal” in deciding whether total uninformed demand equals or exceeds
supply, and places a lower bound on the highest price submitted by the in-
formed bidder (i.e. the highest price at which at least one unit is demanded
by the informed bidder). Equilibria not satisfying the condition exist. In
these, uninformed bidders appropriate some of the information rent. Further,
the condition is quite strong in certain cases, casting doubt on existence of
equilibria with zero uninformed payoff. If there is no such equilibrium, infor-
mational free riding characterizes all equilibria in uniform price auctions. I
discuss application of the results to Treasury auctions as well as repo auctions.
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price, informational free riding, Treasury auctions, repo auctions
jel classification: D44.
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1. Introduction
Multi-unit common value auctions with a uniform pricing rule and demand func-
tion bids are in widespread use. Examples include Treasury bill auctions in the US
and other countries, index-linked bond sales in the US, corporate bond auctions
and IPO auctions conducted over the Internet (such as Hambrechts OpenBook
auction which sells corporate bonds online), and money market repo auctions.
Under the uniform pricing rule, all winners pay the market clearing price, dened
as the highest bid at which aggregate demand equals or exceeds supply (i.e. the
lowest price at which some positive quantity is won by some bidder) (1).
In such auctions it is often important to know how uninformed bidders fare in the
presence of informed bidders. For example, in treasury auctions, the designers
might want to choose a format to encourage participation by uninformed bidders.
For single unit rst price auctions, Milgrom (1979)(2) provides general results to
the e¤ect that in the presence of a bidder with better information, less informed
bidders cannot earn a strictly positive payo¤. With multiple units, rst price
auctions correspond to discriminatory auctions. In a pure common value setting,
and demand function bids, the entire supply is like one unit, and the results for
single unit rst price auctions extend easily to discriminatory auctions. In such
auctions it is impossible for an uninformed bidder to free ride on the information
of the informed bidder since winning bidders pay their own bids. However, under
a uniform pricing rule, there is scope for demanding some units at a high price to
ensure winning those units but still pay a lower price. Indeed, it is very easy to
construct equilibria in uniform price auctions in which some uninformed bidders
(1)An alternative denition of market clearing price is the highest losing bid. Under this
denition, the auction would become a second-price auction as the number of units is reduced
to 1. Here, in contrast, the auction reduces to a rst-price auction as the number of units
is reduced to 1. The denition used here is the denition used in all practical applications
including Treasury auctions, index-linked bonds sales, IPO auctions, corporate bond auctions,
and repo auctions. The results derived in any analysis of such auctions do depend on this
denition in an important way.
(2)See also Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber
(1983).
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2earn a positive payo¤. The objective of this paper is to ask whether this arises
only in special cases or generally.
To see how equilibria with free riding can be constructed, consider the following
example. Suppose 10 units are being auctioned. There are three bidders. Each
unit is valued at V by all bidders, which is a random variable with a uniform
distribution on [0; 1]. Bidder 0 knows the realization v of V , and the other two
bidders (1 and 2) know only the distribution of V . Suppose the reservation price
is 0.
Suppose uninformed bidder 1 demands 9 units at price 1 and demands the last
unit at price 0 (i.e. 1 submits a at demand function at a price 1 on 9 units).
Bidders 0 and 2 then compete for a single unit, and whoever posts a higher price
over this unit wins the unit and pays their own bid since this bid is the market
clearing price. Solving for the best response of bidders 0 and 2 is exactly like
solving a single unit rst price common value auction with one informed and
one uninformed bidder. This latter auction has been analyzed by Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983). Using their results, the best responses of
the informed bidder as well as bidder 2 can be calculated. Further, it turns out
that given these strategies, the original demand function submitted by bidder
1 is a best response. Thus in equilibrium, bidder 1 wins 9 units at the market
clearing price, which is the highest of the prices bid by bidders 0 and 2 on the
rst unit. I construct an example along these lines later in the paper and, for the
sake of completeness, provide a detailed proof.
It is then important to ask whether such free riding occurs only in special cases
(and therefore should be viewed as pathological), or whether it is the usual out-
come. If there are natural conditions that guarantee a zero prot for any unin-
formed bidder in the presence of an informed bidder, we should conclude that
free riding arises only in special cases, and is therefore not a very important
phenomenon. To address the issue, I derive the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for uninformed bidders to earn a zero payo¤ in any equilibrium. Clearly,
any equilibrium that does not satisfy the condition is characterized by a positive
payo¤ for some uninformed bidders. Roughly, the condition requires that there
should be enough demand by uninformed bidders at least at low prices so that no
3single uninformed bidder can be pivotalin deciding whether total uninformed
demand equals or exceeds supply, and places a lower bound on the highest price
(i.e. the highest price at which at least one unit is demanded) submitted by the
informed bidder.
The rough intuition for the result is as follows. If some uninformed bidder is
pivotal in the above sense, he can reduce demand and force the market clearing
price to coincide with some bid from the informed bidder. This helps in free
riding. Further, if the highest price at which the informed bidder demands the
rst unit is low, this reduces the implicit winners cursefaced by uninformed
bidders whenever they win units by outbidding the informed bidder. This, in
turn, makes it easier for uninformed bidders to free ride.
While the question of existence of an equilibrium under the condition is moot,
non-existence would suggest that all equilibria are characterized by positive prof-
its for the uninformed. The issue is discussed further in section 7, which discusses
applications to Treasury auctions as well as repo auctions.
Ausubel and Cramton (1998) have pointed out a property of uniform-price auc-
tions in the presence of private value elements. They show that if there exists
any equilibrium in such an auction, it is characterized by demand reductionby
bidders (shading of bids to obtain a better price), which results in ine¢ ciency.
Here I focus on the complementary case of pure common values so that neither
demand reduction, nor ine¢ ciency is an issue(3).
The methods developed here to address the above issue rely on using properties of
the marginal price distributions of bidders induced through their demand function
bids. The technique employed here is new, and might help in characterizing
equilibria in more complex multi-unit auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
model. Section 3 presents the main result. Sections 4 and 6 prove su¢ ciency
and necessity, respectively. Section 5 provides an example of equilibrium with
(3)See Klemperer (1999) for a discussion of the recent literature on multi-unit auctions. The
concerns here are somewhat tangential to this literature, so I do not discuss it in any detail
here.
4positive uniformed payo¤. Finally, section 7 discusses whether the condition is
very strong in some cases, and applies the results to Treasury auctions and repo
auctions.
2. The Set-Up
S > 1 units are o¤ered for sale. Each unit has a value V . This is a random
variable with a continuous distribution function F () and density function f()
over a support [0; V ]. The distribution of V is public information.
There is one informed bidder and 2 uninformed bidders. The bidders are indexed
by f0; 1; 2g. Bidder 0 is informed and the others are uninformed. All bidders are
risk neutral.
The informed bidder knows the realization of V prior to the auction. The unin-
formed bidders have access to only public information(4).
Bids and Strategies. A bid is any decreasing function q(p) mapping the set of
prices [0; V ] to the set of quantities f0; 1; : : : ; Sg Since there are S discrete units,
a bid function is a step function:
q(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for p1 < p  V ,
1 for p2 < p  p1,
...
...
S for 0  p  pS,
(2.1)
The following representation of a bid function is very useful. Note that the inverse
of a bid function can be derived as follows:
p(~q) =
(
maxpfpjq(p)  ~qg if this exists,
0 otherwise.
(4)This simplies the analysis. However, the same analysis would go through so long as the
informed bidder has betterinformation compared to the public information -i.e. he observes
an informative signal which the others do not observe.
5The resulting function p() is the inverse demand function, and thus a bid can be
written as a vector (p1; : : : ; pS), such that
p(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
p1 over 1 unit,
p2 over 2 units,
...
...
pS over S units,
where
V  p1  p2  : : :  pS  0: (2.2)
Let 
 be the set of vectors (p1; : : : ; pS) that satisfy (2.2). Then 
  <S+ is the
set of bid functions. Note that this is convex and compact.
Figure 1 shows the set of bids 
 for S = 2.
V0
V
p2
p1


Figure 1. The set of bids for S = 2 is the triangle given by
0  p2  p1  V .
Without loss of generality I restrict attention to pure strategies for the informed
bidder. A pure strategy for the informed bidder is a mapping 0 : [0; V ]! 
. The
interpretation is that learning the realization of V , the informed bidder submits
a bid q0(p). A strategy of the informed bidder is written either as q0(p)(V ), or
inverted as a price vector (p 01(V ); : : : ; p 0S(V )), where p 0k(V ) is the price bid by
bidder 0 on the k-th unit.
A pure strategy for uninformed bidder i, i 2 f1; 2g is simply a bid qi(p), which
is inverted as a price vector (p i1; : : : ; p iS), where p ik is the price bid by i on the
6k-th unit. A mixed strategy for uninformed bidder i is given by a probability
distribution i over 
.
Market Clearing Price, Allocation Rule. For any K  S, the market clear-
ing price m(K) is given by:(5)
m(K) = sup
p
 
pjq0(p)() +
2X
i=1
qi(p)  K
!
:
Finally, the quantity won by a particular bid needs to be specied. Suppose
bidder ` submits a demand function q`(p) specifying positive prices for k units,
k 6 S. Let Q^ be total demand at prices strictly above m(S). The winning
function qw` (p) is specied below.
qw` (p) =
8><>:
k if pk > m(S),
k0 + `(S   Q^) if pk = m(S),
0 otherwise.
where k0 is the highest integer below k such that pk0 > pk, and the fraction ` is
given by
` =
k
q0(m(S))() +
2X
i=1
qi(m(S))
Thus if the price bid is above the market clearing price, the bidder wins the
associated quantity bid, and if the price bid is equal to the market clearing price,
a bidder wins a fraction of the remaining supply of S   Q^ proportional to the
ratio of his own demand to total demand at the market clearing price(6).
Each winning bidder pays the market clearing price for each unit won.
(5)See also footnote (1).
(6)If `(S   Q^) is not an integer, the bidder is allocated the greatest integer less than this.
The remaining unit is then allocated randomly according to proportional probabilities.
73. Zero Uninformed Payoff: the Necessary and Sufficient
Condition
The following theorem derives the necessary and su¢ cient condition for unin-
formed bidders to earn a zero payo¤ in any equilibrium. It is useful to dene the
following function.
(t)  E(V jV  t) for t 2 [0; V ]. (3.1)
For example, (V ) = V=2 if V has a uniform distribution on [0; V ]. Note that
the range of the function is the interval [0; EV ]. Note also that () is strictly
increasing.
Let Q(p) denote the aggregate demand by uninformed bidders. Let Q i(p) denote
the total demand by uninformed bidders other than i.
Finally, recall that p 01(V ) denotes the price at which the informed bidder de-
mands 1 unit, which is at least as high as the price at which any subsequent unit
is demanded. The following concept is useful in deriving results.
Denition 1. (Direct competition) Two bidders are said to compete directly
over a unit if the higher of the two prices bid on that unit wins that unit and is
also the market clearing bid.
Theorem 1. The following conditions are jointly necessary and su¢ cient for
uninformed bidders to earn a zero payo¤ in all equilibria:
E(V   xjx  p 01(V )) < 0 for any x that competes directly with p 01(V ), (3.2)
and there is some interval [0; p ] where p > 0, such that for any price p in this
interval,
Q i(p)  S   1 (3.3)
for any uninformed bidder i 2 f1; 2g.
Condition (3.2) says that if an uninformed bidder directly competes with an
informed bidder, the payo¤of the former must be strictly negative. This basically
places a lower bound on the highest price (i.e. the price at which the rst unit is
8demanded) submitted by the informed bidder. In particular, note that
E(V   xj(V )  x) = E(V jV   1(x))  x
= ( 1(x))  x
= 0: (3.4)
Thus condition (3.2) says that p 01(V ) cannot be lower than (V ) for all values
of V .
Next, condition (3.3) says that for at least some low prices, the total demand from
uninformed bidders is high so that no single bidder can be pivotalin deciding
whether total uninformed demand equals or exceeds supply. Under the condition,
total uninformed demand always equals or exceeds supply as 2(S   1)  S for
any S  2. But if for some uninformed bidder (say 1), Q 1 < S  1, 1 can bid on
one or more units and still ensure total uninformed demand is lower than supply.
Condition (3.3) rules out this possibility.
4. Theorem 1: Proof of Sufficiency
The proof proceeds through the following lemmas. I discuss intuition for the
results. The formal proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Under condition (3:2), an uninformed bidder bids on at most S   1
units. Thus for all i 2 f1; 2g, Prob(p iS > 0) = 0.
The intuition is simple. First, in a single-unit auction, if condition (3.2) holds,
any uninformed bid b clearly earns a negative payo¤. Thus in a single unit case,
direct competition against the informed bid is a dominated strategy.
Now compare two demand functions of uninformed bidder 1 that are identical
with respect to the prices at which units 1; : : : ; (S  1) are demanded, but di¤ers
with respect to the price at which unit S is demanded. Demand function (1)
demands S units at a positive price b and demand function (2) demands S units
only at price 0.
The payo¤ from the two demand functions di¤er only if the rst one actually
wins all S units. Now, note that the competition over the S-th unit is exactly
9like the single unit case described above - to win the S-th unit in addition to
(S   1) units, b must exceed both p 01(V ) and p 21. Thus to win the S-th unit, b
must compete directly with p 01(V ) and p 21. From (3.2), winning the S-th unit
by directly competing with p 01(V ) reduces payo¤. Thus demand function (2)
yields a greater payo¤ than demand function (1), and demanding the S-th unit
at a positive price is suboptimal.
Next, note that a mixed strategy of uninformed bidder i, i 2 f1; 2g, induces a
marginal price distribution for any k 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. Let H ik denote the marginal
price distribution over k units induced by the mixed strategy of bidder i. This is
formally dened in section A.1 in the appendix.
For any i 2 f1; 2g, and any k  S, dene p
i
(k) as follows:
p
i
(k)  inf
p
(pjH ik(p) > H ik(0)):
Thus p
i
(k) denotes the inmum of the set of prices strictly above zero at which
demand of uninformed bidder i equals or exceeds k.
Lemma 2. Under conditions (3:2) and (3:3), p
i
(k) 6> 0 for any i 2 f1; 2g, and
any k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; S   1g.
From lemma 1, we know that uninformed bidders never demand all S units at
any positive price - at such prices they demand at most (S  1) units. The result
above now says that the marginal bid distribution on all other units cannot have
a highest lower bound strictly exceeding 0. The intuition is similar to that of
the previous result. To see this, suppose S = 100, and p
1
(40) > 0. Now, from
condition (3.3), there is an interval of prices [0; p ] such that Q 1(p) = q2(p)  99
for p in that interval. This implies that 2 must demand at least 99 units at
positive prices - and thus it is not possible to have p2;60 = 0 with probability 1.
Thus p
2
(60)  0, and p2;60 > 0 with positive probability.
Suppose p
2
(60)  p
1
(40).
Consider a demand function of bidder 2 such that p2;60 = b 2 [p 2(60); p 1(40)].
With such a bid, of course, 2 can win at most 60 units - as the prices at which
he demands any further units are all below p
1
(40). Now, 2 wins all 60 units only
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if b exceeds both p 01(V ) and p 1;41. But as in the last result, winning by beating
p 01(V ) makes a negative prot given (from condition (3.2)) p 01(V ) > (V ). It
is then easy to show that p
2
(60) must exceed p
1
(40), contradicting the original
supposition. Further, while this applies to the case in which there is no atom at
p
1
(40), the formal proof in the appendix shows that the argument easily extends
to the case when there is such an atom.
Therefore the only possibility in equilibrium is that p
1
(k) = 0 for all k 2
f1; : : : ; (S   1)g. Thus a single straightforward intuition - competing directly
against p 01(V ) is a dominated strategy - runs through the two results above.
Proof of su¢ ciency (completed)
The two lemmas above prove su¢ ciency as follows. Lemma 1 shows that an
uninformed bidder demands at most (S 1) units. Lemma 2 then shows that the
marginal price distributions induced by the mixed strategy on units 1 to (S   1)
cannot have lower bounds strictly exceeding 0.
Thus, apart from p
i
(k) = 0, the only other possibility is that the uninformed
bidders do not place any bids. They get a zero payo¤ in this case. The best
response by the informed bidder is to bid so that the market clearing price is 0
for all values of V . These strategies, obviously, cannot be an equilibrium as any
uninformed bidder can deviate and bid any price-quantity pair (; 1) ( > 0 and
close to zero), and earn a positive payo¤.
Thus any equilibrium characterized by the conditions in theorem 1 must satisfy
p
i
(k) = 0, for k 2 1; : : : ; S   1. Further, pi;S = 0. Now, any bid (p1; : : : ; pS)
where p1 = : : : = pS = 0 earns a zero payo¤. Thus if there exists any equilibrium
that satises the condition in theorem 1, all uninformed bidders earn a zero
equilibrium payo¤.k
Proof of Necessity: Before proceeding to prove necessity in section 6, I con-
struct, in the next section, an equilibrium in which uninformed bidders earn a
positive payo¤. This is useful in providing intuition for parts of the proof of ne-
cessity. This also proves existence of equilibria with positive uninformed payo¤.
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5. Positive Uninformed Payoff
As discussed in the introduction, it is straightforward to construct equilibria with
a positive payo¤ for uninformed bidders(7). Below, I construct an equilibrium
along the lines of the example in the introduction in which the informed bidder
wins at most 1 unit, and the rest is won by uninformed bidders. The total payo¤
of uninformed bidders is strictly positive.
Recall from (3.1) that (t)  E(V jV  t) for t 2 [ 0; V ].
Theorem 2. (Example of Equilibrium) The following prole of strategies of
bidders is an equilibrium.
1. The informed bidders strategy is a at demand of S units at a price (v)
for all v 2 [ 0; V ].
2: Uninformed bidder 2 uses the following pure strategy: demand S   1 for
prices p  V , and demand S at price 0.
3: Uninformed bidder 1 uses the following mixed strategy: a at demand of
S units at a random price ~p, where the distribution of ~p is given by
Prob(~p  p) = Prob((V )  p), for any p 2 [ 0; EV ].
It is easy to see that the above strategies form an equilibrium. The strategy of
uninformed bidder 2 is to submit highbids over all but 1 unit, in the sense
that pS 1 exceeds even the highest market clearing price. Such a demand function
always wins S 1 units, while the market clears at the maximum of the bids of the
other two bidders. From the su¢ ciency proof of Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom,
andWeber (1983), it follows directly that the stated price-bid strategies of 0 and 1
are indeed part of a Nash equilibrium on the one unit that they compete on - and
thus a best response in the current game. Further, given the strategies of bidders
0 and 1, there is no gain for 2 from changing his strategy. He is already winning
S   1 units, and if he wants to win even the remaining unit, he has to compete
(7)This example is from Daripa (1997). A result on the advantage of uninformed bidders in
uniform-price auctions was independently derived by Hernando-Veciana in his PhD dissertation,
University College London, 2000 (subsequently Hernando-Veciana (2004)). However, the model
restricts bidders to single-unit demands (rather than demand functions) and denes market
clearing price as the highest losing bid (see footnote (1)) - making for a very di¤erent analysis.
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directly with the informed bidder on this unit. As noted at the beginning of the
last section, this is never benecial for the uninformed bidder - and only serves
to raise the price paid on all infra-marginal units. Thus all bidders are playing a
best response to the specied strategy prole.
For the sake of completeness, I provide the detailed proof in the appendix. The
next result calculates the ex-ante expected payo¤s of bidders in the above equi-
librium..
Corollary 1. The ex-ante expected payo¤ of the informed bidder and the expected
payo¤s of the uninformed bidders in the above equilibrium are given by
0 = E(F (V )(V   (V ))); 1 = 0; and 2 = (S   1) 0:
Clearly, one of the uninformed bidders earn a strictly positive payo¤.
As an aside, note that it is not possible for the informed bidder to demand
many units at very high prices and win most of the units. The intuition is
straightforward - in any equilibrium, the market sometimes clears at a price
submitted by an uninformed bidder. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which
the informed bidder bids very high prices over some units. Now suppose he
receives information that the true value is close to zero. In this case, he would
have a protable deviation to a low bid - otherwise he would win the units he
demands at a high price and could pay a price posted by an uninformed bidder
that is much higher than the true value. Therefore the informed bidder can never
appropriate information rent by demanding units at high prices in the same way
as uninformed bidders.
I now proceed to the proof of necessity of the condition in theorem 1.
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6. Theorem 1: Proof of Necessity
Step 1: Necessity of (3.2) Suppose condition (3.2) does not hold. Then
suppose uninformed bidder 1 deviates and submits an additional bid which is a
price quantity pair (b; 1) (demand 1 unit at price b), where b is in the support
of the distribution of the market clearing price m(S). The original payo¤ of
uninformed bidder 1 in the candidate equilibrium is zero. Therefore, the deviation
payo¤ (denoted by 1) is simply the payo¤ from this new bid. This is given by
the following. The steps are explained below.
1 = Prob(m(S   1)  b  m(S))E(V   bjm(S   1)  b  m(S))
+ Prob(b > m(S   1))E(V  m(S   1)jb > m(S   1))
 Prob(b  m(S))E(V   bjb  m(S)) (6.1)
 Prob(b  p11)Prob(b  p 21)Prob(b  p 01(V ))E(V   bjb  p 01(V ))
 0: (6.2)
The inequality in the second line follows from the fact that E(V  m(S   1)jb >
m(S   1)) > E(V   bjb > m(S   1)) and that fact that Prob(b > m(S   1))  0.
The inequality in the third line follows from the fact that the toughest competition
faced by the bid b is if it had to beat the highest prices posted by each bidder
(including 1 himself) which would be the case, for example, if the supply were
just 1 unit. The highest price posted by the informed bidder is the price at which
he demands the rst unit, given by p 01(V ). Similarly, pi1 denotes the price at
which uninformed bidder i demands the rst unit, i 2 f1; 2g. Note that whenever
b exceeds p11 and p 21, it directly competes with p 01(V ). Since we have started
by supposing that condition (3.2) does not hold, the nal inequality follows.
The deviation must not be successful. This implies we cannot have E(V   bjb 
p 01(V )) > 0 (otherwise the inequality in (6.2) would be strict, making the devia-
tion successful). Similarly, if E(V  bjb  p 01(V )) = 0, but Prob(b > m(S 1)) >
0, the inequality in (6.1) is strict, and the deviation is again successful. Therefore
this case is ruled out as well.
We are then left with E(V   bjb  p 01(V )) = 0 and Prob(b > m(S   1)) = 0 for
any b in the support of the market clearing price.
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Now, since E(V   bjb  p 01(V )) = 0, from (3.4), we can also write (for a more
compact form, which makes the algebra easier) p 01(V ) = (V ).
Thus to prove necessity, we need to prove that the uninformed bidders cannot
earn a zero payo¤ in any equilibrium satisfying p 01(V ) = (V ), and Prob(b >
m(S 1)) = 0 for any b in the support of the market clearing price. The following
result proves this, which completes the proof of necessity of condition (3.2).
Lemma 3. If p 01(V ) = (V ), and Prob(b > m(S   1)) = 0 for any b in the
support of the market clearing price, all uninformed bidders cannot earn a zero
payo¤ in any equilibrium.
While the formal proof is in the appendix, the intuition derives from the last
section. Since Prob(b > m(S   1)) = 0 for any b in the support of the market
clearing price, there must be highprices (higher than the highest market clear-
ing price) posted over (S   1) infra-marginal units. As argued at the end of the
last section, such high price bids cannot come from the informed bidder. In fact,
as in the example provided by theorem 2, the high prices must be posted by at
least one uninformed bidder, who wins all infra-marginal units. Since he pays
the market clearing price, which never exceeds EV and is determined in part by
the informed bidders bids, he earns a strictly positive payo¤. The formal proof
needs to go through many cases to verify that this intuition is correct, and is
relegated to the appendix.
This completes the proof of the necessity of condition (3.2).
Step 2: Necessity of (3.3) Next, suppose condition (3.3) is not satised in
equilibrium. Then suppose Q 1(p) = q2(p)  (S  k) for some k  2 at all prices
p 2 [0; V ].
First, suppose q1(p) < k at all prices. Then total uninformed demand is Q(p) 
(S   1) at all prices.
Let (P1; : : : ; PK ; P(K+1); : : : ; PS) denote the aggregate demand of uninformed bid-
ders where Prob(PK > 0) > 0, K  (S   1), and P(K+1) = : : : = PS = 0 with
probability 1.
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Next, note that if market clears with positive probability at any p 0k(V ), it must
be that p 0k(V ) < V in equilibrium. To see this, suppose not. Then for some k,
and some realization v of V , p 0k(V ) = b  v. Consider a deviation to b0 < v.
If market clears above b or below b0, payo¤ of the informed bidder does not
change. If market clears at some price p 2 [b0; b], the deviation might reduce the
number of units won, but lowers the price paid per unit won. Since at the original
market clearing price b the payo¤ is non-positive, the deviation increases payo¤.
Contradiction.
Now, either the informed bidders bid is such that p 0S(V ) > P1 and the unin-
formed bidders do not win any units, or the market clears at min(Pk; p 0(S k)(V ))
for some k  K. Here p 0(S k)(V ) denotes the price bid by the informed bidder
on the (S   k)-th unit. Given that Prob(Pk > 0) > 0 for k  K, the latter case
must happen with strictly positive probability. But from the argument above,
min(Pk; p 0(S k)(V ))  p 0(S k)(V ) < V . Thus in equilibrium it cannot be that all
uninformed bidders earn a zero payo¤.
Next, suppose that q1(p)  k at all prices, and an equilibrium exists in which
both uninformed bidders earn a zero payo¤. Consider the following deviation by
1: he now bids prices above 0 only on at most k 1 units. Then total uninformed
demand is Q(p)  (S   1) at all prices - and by the argument for the preceding
case, the deviation payo¤ must be strictly positive. Contradiction.
7. Discussion
In multi-unit common value uniform price auctions with demand function bids it
is easy to construct equilibria in which uninformed bidders earn a positive payo¤
at the expense of the informed bidder. The paper asks under whether such equi-
libria should be seen as pathological special cases or are pervasively present. In
single unit rst price auctions, there are general results showing the impossibility
of positive payo¤ for less informed bidders. These extend easily to multi-unit
common value auctions with demand function bids. Here the focus is on uni-
form price auctions, and the question is whether there are natural conditions
under which the result on zero rent for the uninformed bidders extends to such
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auctions. To answer this, the paper derives the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for all equilibria to be characterized by zero payo¤ for uninformed bidders.
The condition requires enough uninformed demand at least at low prices so that
no single bidder can be pivotalin deciding whether total uninformed demand
equals or exceeds supply, and places a lower bound on the highest price (i.e. the
price at which the rst unit is demanded) submitted by the informed bidder.
The intuition, roughly, is as follows. If an uninformed bidder can reduce demand
and force the market clearing price to coincide with some bid from the informed
bidder, this helps him free ride on the informed bidders information. Further,
if the highest price at which the informed bidder demands the rst unit is low,
this reduces the implicit winners cursefaced by uninformed bidders whenever
they win units by outbidding the informed bidder. This, in turn, makes it easier
for uninformed bidders to free ride.
If there are a few uninformed bidders who demand small quantities, this condition
is unlikely to be fullled. This is also true if uninformed bidders could collude.
In such cases uninformed bidders would earn a positive payo¤ in all equilibria,
making free riding a pervasive phenomenon. Examples show that such equilibria
indeed exist.
US Treasury auctions provide an example of small uninformed bidders competing
with a few large more-or-less equally well informed bidders. This scenario ts our
model. There are primary dealers who participate regularly. They receive orders
from customers (hence get a signal of aggregate demand) and bid on their behalf.
There are also uninformed institutional bidders bidding on their own account
occasionally - mostly for exogenous liquidity-demand-driven reasons.
In 1998, the US Treasury switched from using discriminatory auctions for most
categories of government securities to uniform price auctions for selling all se-
curities. This is puzzling to the extent that there is no theory establishing the
superiority - in terms of either e¢ ciency or revenue - of uniform-price auctions
over discriminatory auctions (in fact, as mentioned in the introduction, Ausubel
and Cramton (1998) show that in settings with private value elements, the former
auction format is ine¢ cient). Further, empirical studies have failed to nd any
signicant di¤erence in revenue generated by the two formats.
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The results here suggest that since the uninformed bidders demand only a frac-
tion of the supply in any auction, they must earn a strictly positive payo¤ in a
uniform price auction. In a discriminatory auction, an uninformed bidder gets
no such advantage. Thus uniform price auctions are likely to attract smaller,
less informed bidders, perhaps reducing the chance of successful collusion by the
informed bidders as well the chance of a single bidder being able to corner the
entire market. This sheds some light on the rationale behind the switch to the
uniform price format in US Treasury auctions(8). Indeed, Friedman (1960) had
suggested (informally) that a uniform-price auction makes it di¢ cult to sustain
collusion, as it encourages participation by relatively uninformed bidders(9). The
theory presented here provides a justication for the suggestion.
An opposite picture emerges in the case of repo auctions. Repo auctions consti-
tute the principal instrument of money-market management by the Eurosystem.
The European Central Bank (ECB) uses these auctions as the primary instru-
ment for conducting monetary policy. In the longer-term repo auctions, private
information about the future term structure of interest rates plays an important
role. In March 1999, the ECB switched the auction format for longer-term repos
from uniform-price to discriminatory. In a press conference, the governor said:(10)
The single rate method was chosen in order to encourage less experienced coun-
terparties to participate in the tender. The Governing Council takes the view
that all interested counterparties should by now be su¢ ciently accustomed to the
longer-term renancing operation also to be in a position to participate in this
type of operation under the more market-oriented multiple rate (American)(11)
(8)On the other hand, in countries like the UK and Germany, only the members of specic
groups of investment banks (Gilt-Edged Market Makers in the UK, members of the Bund
Issues Auction Group in Germany) are allowed to bid in Treasury auctions. In these cases,
the question of attracting small bidders does not arise, and these countries have always used
discriminatory auctions.
(9)Friedman (1991), an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, reiterates this argument.
(10)Source: The Presidents introductory statement, Press conference, March 4, 1999,
www.ecb.int/key/st990304.htm.
(11)Discriminatory auctions are often called American auctions in the banking literature. It
is ironic, since the eponymous Treasury department has abandoned this format altogether in
favor of uniform price auctions.
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method of allotment.The concern clearly is that uniform price auctions give an
undue advantage to less well informed bidders. In such auctions, it is very likely
that the no-pivotal-uninformed-bidder condition does not hold. If the condition
does not hold, our results clarify the impact of a uniform price format on the
division of surplus between informed and uninformed bidders. From the gover-
nors statement it seems the objective is to encourage all bidders to be informed
participants, and given the nature of equilibria in uniform price auctions in this
case, discriminatory auctions are clearly better suited for that purpose.
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8. Appendix
A.1. Marginal Price Distribution: A Formal Denition. Amixed strategy
i of uninformed bidder i, i 2 f1; 2g, is a probability distribution on 
. i induces
a marginal price distribution for any k 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. Let H ik denote the marginal
price distribution over unit k induced by the mixed strategy of bidder i. This is
dened as follows:
H ik(~p) =
Z ~p
0
H ik(pk)dpk;
where H ik(pk) is given by
H ik(pk) =
Z pk
0
: : :
Z p(S 1)
0
Z V
pk
: : :
Z V
p2
idp1 : : : dp(k 1)dpS : : : dp(k+1);
where the rst integral refers to the last integrand and so on. Note that we are
integrating over pj for all j 6= k. Note also that for ` < k, p` 2 [p`+1; V ], and for
` > k, p` 2 [0; p` 1].
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, I prove the result with
reference to uninformed bidder 1.
Suppose, on the contrary, that p1S > 0 with strictly positive probability. Consider
the following demand functions of bidder 1:
q(1)(p)   p(1)11 ; p(1)12 ; : : : ; p(1)1S; (A.1)
q(2)(p)   p(2)11 ; p(2)12 ; : : : ; p(2)1S; (A.2)
where p(1)1k = p
(2)
1k for k 2 f1; : : : ; (S   1)g, but p(1)1S = b > 0 = p(2)1S.
The payo¤s from the two demand functions above di¤er only when the market
clears at b (i.e. 1 wins all S units). In this case, both p 01(V )  b and p 21  b.
Let  > 0 be the probability that b wins.
Thus  = Prob(p 01(V )  b)Prob(p 21  b). Let D1 denote the amount by which
the payo¤ of bidder 1 from q(1)(p) exceeds that from q(2)(p).
D1 =  [SE(V   bjp 01(V )  b)  (S   1)E(V  max (p 01(V ); p 21) jp 01(V )  b)]
< E(V   bjp 01(V )  b)
< 0; (A.3)
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where the last step follows from condition (3.2). Thus the payo¤ of bidder 1 from
q(1)(p) is strictly lower than that from q(2)(p). Therefore p1S = 0 is strictly better
than p1S > 0. Contradiction. This proves that Prob(p1S > 0) = 0.k
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, I prove the lemma for
i = 1.
Suppose p
1
(k) > 0 for some k 2 f1; : : : ; S   1g.
Recall that H ik (dened in section A.1) denotes the marginal distribution on the
k-th units induced by the mixed strategy of bidder i, i 2 f1; 2g. Similarly, let
Hi(S k) denote the marginal distribution on (S   k)-th unit.
Recall also that p ik denotes the price bid by uninformed bidder i, i 2 f1; 2g, on
the k-th unit. Similarly, let p i(S k) denote the price bid on the (S   k)-th unit.
Case 1: H1k has no atom at p 1(k).
From condition (3.3), there is an interval of prices [0; p ] such that Q 1(p) =
q2(p)  (S   1) for p in that interval. This implies that 2 must bid prices above
0 on at least (S   1) units - and thus it is not possible to have p 2(S k) = 0 with
probability 1. Thus it must be that p
2
(S   k)  0.
Suppose p
2
(S   k)  p
1
(k).
Any p 2(S k) 2 [p 2(S k); p 1(k)] wins only if both p 1(k+1)  p 2(S k) and p 01(V ) 
p 2(S k)(12). Compare the following demand functions of bidder 2:
q
(1)
2 (p) 
 
p
(1)
21 ; p
(1)
22 ; : : : ; p
(1)
2(S 1); p
(1)
2S

; (A.4)
q
(2)
2 (p) 
 
p
(2)
21 ; p
(2)
22 ; : : : ; p
(2)
2(S 1); p
(2)
2S

; (A.5)
where p(1)2k = p
(2)
2k for k 2 f1; : : : ; (S   k   1)g, but p(1)2(S k) = b > 0 = p(2)2(S k).
Finally, b  p
1
(k).
(12)Note that if H 1k has an atom at p 1(k), p 2(S k) = p 1k could win even if these two
conditions are not satised.
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Let D2 denote the amount by which the payo¤ of bidder 2 from q
(1)
2 (p) exceeds
that from q(2)2 (p).
D2 = Prob(p 01(V )  b)Prob(p 1(k+1)  b)
"
(S   k)E(V   bjp 01(V )  b)
  (S   k   1)E  V  max  p 01(V ); p 1(k+1) jp 01(V )  b
#
< Prob(p 01(V )  b)Prob(p 1(k+1)  b)E(V   bjp 01(V )  b)
< 0; (A.6)
where the last step follows from condition (3.2). Thus q(2)2 () yields a strictly
greater payo¤. Since this is true for any b  p
1
(k), p 2(S k) = p 1(k) is strictly
worse than p 2(S k) = 0. Thus there exists  > 0 such that in equilibrium
p 2(S k)  p 1(k) + : (A.7)
This implies that p
2
(S   k) > p
1
(k), which contradicts the original supposition.
Now suppose p
2
(S   k) > p
1
(k). In the above analysis, switch the labels 1k
and 2(S   k). This then leads to the conclusion that p
2
(S   k) < p
1
(k).
Contradiction.
Thus there is no equilibrium with p
i
(k) > 0 for any i 2 f1; 2g and any k 2
f1; : : : ; (S   1)g.
Case 2: H1k has an atom at p 1(k).
If p
2
(S k) < p
1
(k), the same argument as in case 1 applies. The only remaining
possibility is that p
2
(S   k) = p
1
(k).
Suppose p 2(S k) = b = p 1(k) is preferred to p 2(S k) = 0 (otherwise the proof
is already done). This can happen only because b wins with strictly positive
probability even when p 01(V ) > b (if b wins only when p 01(V )  b, then, as
shown in case 1, it would be better to deviate to p 2(S k) = 0).
Now, b can win with strictly positive probability even when p 01(V ) > b because
p 1k = p 1(k) with strictly positive probability mass. Whenever b wins and also
p 01(V ) > b, the total demand by 1 and 2 at b is S units. Since the informed
22
bidder demands at least 1 unit at some price above b, the total units available at
price b is at most (S   1).
It follows that whenever b wins and also p 01(V ) > b, bidder 2 does not win all
(S   k) units - but wins at most (S   k)   (where 0 <  < 1).
But since p 2(S k) = b is preferred to p 2(S k) = 0, it must be that by raising
p 2(S k) by a very small amount 2 can improve his payo¤ as price paid increases
continuously while quantity won changes discontinuously from (S   k)    to
(S   k).
Thus if in equilibrium p
2
(S  k) = p
1
(k), H2(S k) has no atom at p 2(S  k). But
then, by the argument in case 1, the bid p
1
(k) of 1 (this is made with strictly
positive probability) makes a strictly negative prot. Thus 1 cannot have an
atom at p
1
(k). Contradiction.
This completes the proof.k
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2. Given bidder 2s strategy, bidders 0 and 1 face a
single-unit rst-price auction. Thus for any demand function submitted by 0 or
1, only the price at which the rst unit is demanded matters.
Now, given the mixed strategy of bidder 1, suppose V = v, and bidder 0 submits
p 01(V ) = x. Since bidder 2s bid does not exceed EV , x > EV cannot be a best
response. Thus x 2 [0; EV ]. Thus there is some t 2 [0; V ] such that (t) = x.
The payo¤ of bidder 0 from this is 0(t) = Prob(~p < (t))(v   (t)). Given
the equilibrium strategy of bidder 1, Prob(~p < (t)) = Prob((V ) < (t)) =
Prob(V  t) = F (t). Thus
0(t) = F (t)(v   (t)) = F (t)(v   E(V jV  t)) = F (t)v  
Z t
0
V f(V )dV:
Maximizing with respect to t, the rst order condition is given by f(t)v tf(t) = 0
which implies t = v.
Bidder 1s payo¤ from any bid with p1 > EV is negative. The payo¤ from any
bid with p1 2 [0; EV ] is
1(p1) = Prob((V )  p1)E(V   p1j(V )  p1) = 0
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where the second step follows from (3.4). Thus given 2s strategy, the strategies
of bidders 0 and 1 are best responses to the strategies of other players.
It remains to be shown that given the strategies of 0 and 1, there is no protable
deviation for 2. If 2 deviates and lowers the prices currently bid on some units -
he would either not win (if the bid is below the maximum of the bids of the other
two bidders) or win at the same price as before (if the bid is above the maximum
of the bids of the other two bidders).
There is clearly no scope for 2 to increase the prices currently bid on any of the
(S   1) units (even if scope existed, such a move would not a¤ect 2s payo¤).
Next, suppose 2 decides to bid a positive price on the S-th unit. If p 2S > EV ,
the market clears at p 2S and the payo¤ is strictly negative. If p 2S  EV , 2
wins the S-th unit with positive probability (say  > 0) and the extra payo¤
earned on the S-th unit is E(V  p 2Sjp 2S  (V )) = (( 1(p 2S)) p 2S) = 0.
But at the same time, this raises the distribution of the market clearing price,
because whenever the market previously cleared below p 2S, it now clears at p 2S.
Thus no component of 2s payo¤ increases by this deviation, but the expected
price paid on all infra-marginal units strictly increases. Thus the deviation is not
protable.k
A.5. Proof of Corollary 1. It has already been shown that 1 = 0. Next,
0 =
Z V
0
Prob(p1 < (v))(v   (v))f(v)dv
=
Z V
0
F (v)(v   (v))f(v)dv
Finally, for any given p1 2 [0; EV ],
2(p1)
S   1 = Prob(V  
 1(p1))E(V   p1jV   1(p1))
+ Prob(V >  1(p1))E(V   (V )jV >  1(p1))
E(V   p1jV   1(p1)) = ( 1(p1))  p1 = 0. Thus the rst term on the right
hand side is 0. As for the second term, note that for any given p1 2 [0; EV ],
0(p1) = Prob(V > 
 1(p1))E(V   (V )jV >  1(p1)), and thus 0 can also
be written as
R V
0
0(p1)dG(p1), where G() is the distribution of the price bid by
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uninformed bidder 1 given in theorem 2. From this, we have 2(p1)=(S   1) =
0(p1). Now, 2 =
R V
0
2(p1)dG(p1). It follows directly that 2 = (S   1)0.k
A.6. Proof of Lemma 3.
Step 1. Let m(S) denote the lowest upper bound of the distribution of market
clearing prices. If Prob(b > m(S  1)) = 0 for any b in the support of the market
clearing price, this implies that the price at which S   1 units are demanded is
always higher than the market clearing bid, i.e.
Prob(m(S   1)  m(S)) = 1: (?)
Step 2. Since p 01(V ) = (V ) (and therefore p 0k(V )  (V ) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; Sg),
it must be that for any b in the support of the market clearing bid, there is a
value of V low enough so that (V ) < b, i.e. the informed bidder demands units
only at prices below b. Thus to satisfy condition (?), it must be that one or more
uninformed bidders demand (S   1) units at some price pH above m(S).
Specically, let Ki  0, i 2 f1; 2g, denote the demand of uninformed bidder i at
price pH , where (K1; K2) is such that K1 +K2 = S   1.
Step 3. Now, if m(S) < EV , from (?), it must be that m(S) < EV with proba-
bility 1, which implies that both uninformed bidders cannot earn a zero payo¤,
and the proof is done.
Step 4. Next, suppose m(S)  EV .
Step 4.1. Note that the support of (V ) is [0; EV ]. Thusm(S) > EV can happen
only if at least 1 uninformed bidder i demands a further unit (further than Ki)
at a price greater than EV . But since in this case the market clears at a price
greater than EV , and uninformed bidders win the entire supply at this price, at
least one uninformed bidder earns a strictly negative payo¤. Any such bidder
can protably deviate to demanding the (Ki + 1)-th unit at a lower price or
to a lower quantity demanded at positive prices (even demanding nothing is a
protable deviation).
This rules out m(S) > EV .
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Step 4.2. The only case left ism(S) = EV . Supposem(S) = EV with probability
1. Then the informed bidder does not win any units with probability 1, and gets
a zero payo¤. But recall that at prices above EV , the demand is no more than
(S   1) units. Then for any value v of V such that v > EV , the informed bidder
can deviate and demand a unit at some price EV < p < v, win that unit and
pay at most p, thus earning a positive payo¤.
Thus it must be that m(S) < EV with strictly positive probability.
Step 4.3. Now, suppose uninformed bidder i bids a price pi  0 on the (Ki + 1)-
th unit. The above arguments establish that pi 2 [0; EV ]. pi directly competes
with pj, i 6= j, and p 01(V ) for the S-th unit. For any price pi at which the
(Ki + 1)-th unit is demanded by uninformed bidder i, the payo¤ on this unit is
i(pi) = Prob(pi > p 01(V ))E(V   pijpi > p 01(V )) = 0.
Now, the market clears at max(p1; p2; p 01(V )), and this is the price which un-
informed bidder i pays on Ki units. Further, using the argument in step (4.2)
above, the market clears at p 01(V ) with strictly positive probability. Thus the
payo¤ on Ki units is strictly greater than Ki times i(pi). Since i(pi) = 0, the
payo¤ of uninformed bidder i on Ki units is strictly positive.
Thus at least 1 uninformed bidder earns a strictly positive payo¤ on Ki  (S 1)
units(13). This completes the proof.k
(13)In fact, it is easy to show (but not needed here, so I do not show this) that if Prob(b >
m(S   1)) = 0 for any b in the support of the market clearing price, the only possibility in
equilibrium is for one uninformed bidder to bid highon (S 1) units and the other uninformed
bidder and the informed bidder is to compete directly over the S-th unit - exactly as in the
example in theorem 2 in section 5. The uninformed bidder bidding high wins (S  1) units and
earns a strictly positive payo¤ given by corollary 1.
